Institutions/Organizations

1. Why would states choose to work through international institutions? Do the incentives differ for strong versus weak states?

States choose to work through international institutions for several reasons.

- power reasons:
o small states can bandwagon with large, capable states (Schweller, Waltz)
o (However, institutions are merely epiphenomenal and reflect power relations; no independent power)
o strong states can signal benevolence by choosing to create a constitutional order where they voluntarily restrain power to secure it in the long run (Ikenberry, After Victory)
- Economistic reasons:
o mitigate the worst effects of anarchy by promoting efficiency, cooperation, solve market failure, collective action problems, provide information (Keohane, Axelrod).
o States will work through institution when it helps them accomplish their purposes. When there is no overlapping of interests, we shouldn’t expect them to create institutions and work in them (Keohane and Martin)
o Coordination in non-security areas, such as in telecommunications regimes (Krasner)
o Institutions solve strategic problems (POW convention, James Morrow)
o States and institutions are in a Principal Agent relationship
- Domestic reasons
o Locking in order, transitioning democracies are most likely to join and support international institutions (Mansfield and Pevehouse).
o Implements popular domestic priorities (two birds with one stone) (Moravcsik and human right regimes)
o Public is swayed by information coming out of security institutions, and it varies by the character of the institution.
- Reputation/Trust
o Builds reputation and trust (Keohane, Kydd)
o Signals type (Walt, Jervis, Glaser)
o Credible commitment (significant and costly barriers to entry help states prove that they are committed to the goals) (Kydd)
- Constructivist reasons
o States identify with the socialization of the institutions (Schimmefennig and EU integration)
o NATO enlargement is an effort to institutionalize and socialize “those like us” (Kydd) as opposed to the “other” (Katzenstein and Hemmer)
o States, especially weak states, see institutions as a level playing field where there is a chance for persuasion and true argumentation where their voices and interests can be heard. (Risse Checkel)
o Institutions have legitimacy, and therefore states participate to be seen as legitimate. Legitimacy is a source of power, regardless of the size of the state.
o States act multilaterally through institutions because the norm of multilateralism is seen as legitimate and therefore confers power on states who act unilaterally. This is why it is desirable to get the stamp of approval from the UN Security Council for violent activity.

Incentive for strong states to work through institutions:
- create non-threatening hegemonic order (Ikenberry)
- they have more to lose in general, so anything that can help them overcome anarchy is best for strong states (although equally good for small states)
Incentives for weak states to work through institutions
- weak can bandwagon, balance against the powerful through institutions
- transitioning democracies can benefit from the accountability of the institution and path dependency it affords (Mansfield Pevehouse, Moravcsik)
- does the work that the state needs domestically (two birds with one stone, Moravcsik)
- get a seat at the negotiation table and persuade, argue (Risse, Checkel). Their concerns will be heard.